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Abstract A research biobank is a collection of personal health and lifestyle
information, including genetic samples of yet unknown but possibly large infor-
mation potential about the participant. For the participants, the risk of taking part is
not bodily harm but infringements of their privacy and the harmful consequences
such infringements might have. But what do we mean by privacy? Which harms are
we talking about? To address such questions we need to get a grip on what privacy
is all about and aim for a fruitful perspective on the issues of property and privacy
rights in the context of biobanking. This paper argues that the limits and handling of
private matters is determined in speciﬁc social relations. The crucial point is thus to
determine which information and activities are or are not the legitimate concern of
others. Privacy and property rights should be seen as balanced by duties, that is as
inherently relational interests extending into the public sphere, rather than to see
these rights as the control of an object—for instance the participant’s biobank
material.
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Introduction
What does research biobanking imply for the recruited participants? A research
biobank is a collection of quite personal health and lifestyle information and of
genetic samples of yet unknown but possibly large information potential about the
participant. Are large-scale public biobank projects involving a substantial part of a
country’s population a possible colonization by the State of the private sphere of its
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liberal societies? Or is it, advertently or inadvertently, a return to the mindset of
totalitarian regimes?
Does commercial biobanking, on the other hand, imply a massive commodiﬁ-
cation of the participants in involving the transaction of one’s DNA in return for
some kind of sharing of the beneﬁts of the biobank research? And if no policy of
beneﬁt sharing is involved, is commercial biobanking a massive exploitation of the
research participants? Does the requirement of informed consent by the participants
alter any of these concerns? Does the voluntariness of commodiﬁcation or of giving
up your privacy erase any questions of the ethical legitimacy of biobanking?
Biobank research is research on information concerning and tissue samples from the
participants. For the participants, the risk of taking part is not bodily harm but
infringements of their privacy and the harmful consequences such infringements
might have. But what does this mean? What do we mean by privacy? Which harms
are we talking about?
In order to address these questions we need to get a grip on what privacy is all
about, and aim for a fruitful perspective on the issues of property and privacy rights
in the context of biobanking. In this paper, I argue that the limits and handling of
private matters is determined in speciﬁc social relations. The crucial point is thus to
determine which information and activities are or are not the legitimate concern of
others. Privacy and property rights should be seen as balanced by duties, that is as
inherently relational interests extending into the public sphere, rather than to see
these rights as the control of an object—for instance the participant’s biobank
material.
Privacy as Control
What is privacy? What is a right to privacy? After an extensive discussion of
different attempts at deﬁning a right to privacy, Adam Moore settles for this one: ‘‘A
right to privacy is a right to control access to and uses of—places, bodies, and
personal information’’ (Moore 2008, p. 421). Moore’s view is that privacy is
essentially a normative concept. For him, this means that the privacy of an
individual is to be understood in terms of rights of privacy granted the individual.
According to Moore, privacy is about access and the ability of the individual to
control access: ‘‘When an individual restricts access to himself and to personal
information, we may say that a condition of privacy obtains’’ (p. 421). The right of
the individual to control access is consequently the crucial normative and
descriptive question of privacy identiﬁcation.
To deﬁne privacy in terms of control does, however, seem to get things wrong.
As pointed out by William Parent: if someone voluntarily chooses to divulge very
personal information to others, this would amount to giving up privacy rather than
to exercise privacy control (Parent 1983, p. 273). Moore argues against Parent by
asserting that just as one freely can limit one’s freedom, one can in a controlled way
limit one’s control. But the crucial point here is that Moore’s account of privacy is
descriptively inaccurate. A person can autonomously decide to give up his
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lead an autonomous life, since I decide what he will do (see, for example, Ursin
2009). Likewise, a person can quite independently decide to give up her privacy.
She voluntarily decides to install webcams in every room of her house. She will then
simply no longer lead a home life of privacy, since everybody is invited to watch
her.
This brings out two important aspects of the notion of privacy as a matter of
rights—and of duties. Firstly, it points to the connection between intentionality and
control in matters of privacy. I enjoy privacy in my ﬂat even if it is possible to peek
in my windows with a lot of equipment and effort. But if I broadcast my home life I
enjoy no privacy anymore. It is the intention and reasonable effort on my part to
control access to my private sphere that is crucial, not that the walls of my private
sphere are actually impenetrable. Thus my privacy is part of a social relation, rather
than exempt from social relations: I do not have to make sure that you are unable to
read my diary in order for it to be private, I just have to make it clear that you are
not supposed to read it and trust you not to.
Secondly, the notion of privacy refers to certain facts about and acts committed
by an individual. Which facts and acts those are is not, however, decided by that
individual alone. The right to be left alone and to keep information out of the public
eye is not just a right but also a duty of the individual. What is and is not a duty to
keep to oneself is a matter of context and culture. How much clothing a woman
must wear on a hot summer day in order to be decent depends on whether she is at
the beach or in court, and on whether she is in Sweden or in Saudi-Arabia.
Participants in reality shows like Big Brother might be considered indecent and
vulgar because they reveal too much of what is considered private matters, and
consequently should be kept to oneself. Moreover, the blurring of the line between
the public and the private is, as Richard Sennett argues in The Fall of Public Man
(1977), no less than undermining the basis for civilized societies based on joint
efforts to pursue political interests in a principled way rather than as group interests
based on close relations of friendship.
If privacy was just about the ability to keep things to oneself, that would mean
that once these things are known by others they are no longer private. This view is
actually endorsed by Moore: ‘‘by yielding control to others the condition of privacy
is diminished or no longer obtains’’ (Moore 2008, p. 415). As the condition of
privacy is socially determined, the yielding of control to others of matters
considered private must lead to a collective change in the perception of these
matters for them to lose their privacy status. When Craig Venter in 2008 published
his genome on the Internet he gave up his genetic privacy. In doing so, he might,
however, induce a change of perception concerning the private character of genetic
information. Maybe the harm of making known your genome is not so big after all?
Maybe we were wrong in regarding genetic information as necessarily sensitive and
thus something the individual should strive to keep for himself?
A sign of such a cultural change concerning the view of genetic privacy is the
Personal Genome Project of Harvard Medical School (http://www.personalgenomes.
org/). The Personal Genome Project opened itself up to the public on April 25, 2009
and aims to sign up 100,000 volunteers for the world’s ﬁrst publicly accessible
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their names published. But their genomic information, complete medical histories,
and even their photos will be made public. In an article defending the ethical policy
of the Personal Genome Project, Lunshof et al. states that
volunteers consent to unrestricted re-disclosure of data originating from a
conﬁdential relationship, namely their health records, and to unrestricted
disclosure of information that emerges from any future research on their
genotype–phenotype data set, the information content of which cannot be
predicted. No promises of anonymity, privacy or conﬁdentiality are made. The
leading moral principle is veracity—telling the truth—which should precede
autonomy (Lunshof et al. 2008, p. 409).
If genetic privacy is practically impossible to uphold in biobank research
projects, as argued by Lunshof et al., the freedom to divulge any genetic information
about yourself should be morally approved of in society in order to make legitimate
recruitment to biobank research possible. Thus the condition that ‘‘by yielding
control to others the condition of privacy is diminished or no longer obtains’’ is
granted by a normative change in society on the nature of personal genetic/genomic
information.
Conﬁdentiality and Relational Privacy
In addition to the private thoughts and secluded life of the individual, matters of
privacy comprise of shared information and relations of conﬁdentiality. The
personal information contained in biobanks is traditionally regarded as conﬁdential
information. The use of this information is regulated by the continuous consent of
the individual and the decisions of the researchers, ethics committees and
governmental bodies.
What is the relationship between privacy and conﬁdentiality? On the one hand,
conﬁdentiality could be seen as just a special case of privacy protection, in which
the duties of the one who has gained access to personal information about another
person has a clear duty not to pass on the information to outsiders, or use it for other
ends than the one agreed upon. On the other hand, conﬁdentiality could be viewed
as quite different from privacy, in making it an ethical and even legal duty of the
one who has gained access to keep the information conﬁdential—even if this could
harm persons outside of the relation of conﬁdentiality. This difference will be
elucidated in this section by bringing in the notion of relational privacy.
The notion of conﬁdentiality shows in a good way the social nature of private
information, but in a poor way the normativity of privacy relations. On the one
hand, the conﬁdentiality relation lacks the necessary nuances of normativity
concerning the use of information inside of the relation of shared information. This
is pointed out by Graeme Laurie in saying that
to the extent that the duty of conﬁdentiality is solely concerned with keeping
conﬁdential information out of the public sphere, it says nothing about the
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subjects of the information so as to ensure, inter alia, that the personal interests
of these individuals are not treated with a lack of respect by unwarranted uses
of information with regard to the subjects themselves (Laurie 2002, p. 3).
A patient’s or a research participant’s right not to know certain genetic risk
information is of special concern for Laurie here.
On the other hand, the conﬁdentiality relation lacks the necessary nuances of
normativity concerning the use of information outside of the relation of shared
information. Again this is pointed out by Laurie:
Clearly, although a health care professional owes a duty to respect a patient’s
genetic information as conﬁdential, conﬂicts can arise about access to that
information and its control, and the problem becomes whether the health care
professional would ever be justiﬁed legally ethically or professionally in
disclosing such conﬁdential data. So, how do the rules relating to conﬁden-
tiality apply to genetic information, especially when one considers that third
parties such as relatives or the state can claim a signiﬁcant interest in many
forms of this information (p. 230)?
In order to see clearly the normative nuances concerning the use of information
inside and outside of the relation of shared information we should have a relational
understanding of privacy. Instead of trying to identify what kinds of information the
individual has a right to control access to, or to make detailed contracts of
conﬁdentiality, we should view my right to privacy as essentially dependent on your
corresponding duty to protect my privacy. To protect my privacy implies for you a
duty not to obtain or spread information about me or the group to which I belong
that is clearly not someone else’s business.
The limits of my private matters are here explicitly determined by normative
assessments of both myself and others. This view is reﬂected in Judith DeCew’s
deﬁnition of the private as comprising of ‘‘whatever types of information and
activities are not, according to a reasonable person in normal circumstances, the
legitimate concern of others’’ (DeCew 1997, p. 58). This perspective makes clear
the connection between my right to privacy and the duty of others to protect this
right. It also opens up for a clear view of the connection between the right to privacy
of the individual, and the perfect or imperfect duty to disclose information for the
common good or other interests.
Ferdinand Schoeman has criticized making the absence of other’s concern a
criterion of the private in a way parallel to the criticism raised above to making
control the criterion of the private:
Such a criterion, plausible at ﬁrst, is subject to the following difﬁculty.
Whatever one might claim as falling within his or her private realm could be
reclassiﬁed on the basis of others manipulating the situation so that they have a
stake in that state of affairs. … Few would be tempted to think that such
practices deprive these domains of life of their private character (Schoeman
1984, pp. 7–8).
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that the limits and handling of private matters is determined in speciﬁc social
relations, is how to determine which information and activities are or are not the
legitimate concern of others (see, for example, Ursin 2008). In order to explore this
further we should therefore have a look at the privacy issues in a speciﬁc context—
in this paper, the context of participation in commercialized biobanking.
The Ethical Challenges of Commercial Biobanking
For more than a century, tissue samples have been collected for research and clinical
purposes. Several hundred millions of samples are presently stored at hospitals
world wide. These tissue banks are mainly publicly owned. Some clinical genomics
companies also operate their own bio-repositories, or gather genetic information
from participating patients and from a few of the many publicly owned tissue banks,
notably from university hospital collections.
The scientiﬁcally and ethically most promising way to do genomics research
might, however, be in the form of public–private collaboration on the use of public
population research biobanks. Such biobanks offer ample opportunities for linking
genealogical, environmental and lifestyle information provided by the participants
with public medical registers. The legal and ethical aspects are also ideally ‘‘taken
care of’’ in terms of an exhaustive consent given by the participants—exhausting the
possible ethical and legal problems that might hamper research and public relations.
As noted by Graham Lewis: ‘‘The several public collections or biobanks already
established, or in the process of being established, provide another, and perhaps the
most signiﬁcant, avenue for commercial exploration of genetic data in the future’’
(Lewis 2004, p. 193).
The potential of genomics to beneﬁt public health care in terms of more precise
prevention and treatment of diseases has raised the interest of governments to
establish or prioritize existing large population biobanks well suited for genetic
research. Research in genetic epidemiology and pharmacogenomics might be of
great beneﬁt for the cost of patient treatment, the precision of disease prevention and
the effectiveness of prescribed drugs. Population biobanks might also be vital to the
isolation of disease genes in order to develop new drugs, and consequently of
particular interest to the pharmaceutical industry. In this way, governments have an
interest in establishing population biobanks both in order to save money in making
health care treatment more targeted and efﬁcient, as well as creating new jobs in
arranging for local biotechnological companies or branches to emerge.
Research biobanks are currently set up by public institutions and private
companies to explore the complex interrelations between genotypic and phenotypic
elements leading to disease. But biobanking is about actually doing biobank
research. It is about putting the biobank material to good use and not just about
making a collection. Participants and researchers alike take part in order to make the
creation of new medical knowledge, therapies and drugs possible. A prerequisite for
accomplishing this, it is argued, is state-industry collaboration. The task of drug
development, for instance, has internationally been given to the pharmaceutical
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for going from ‘‘genes to drugs’’, to use the phrase of deCODE genetics
(http://www.decodeme.com).
The view that biobank research is of great ethical, scientiﬁc and economic
signiﬁcance has, to take a speciﬁc example from the Scandinavian context, recently
been voiced by important Norwegian ethicists and researchers. They argue that
Norwegians have an economic interest in pursuing biobank research and, moreover,
even have an ethical obligation to establish biobanks and do biobank research to the
health beneﬁt of the global community. There is a vision of the need for collective
action for the manifold advantage of all, and in order to beneﬁt from the potential of
existing Norwegian biobanks and health registers, and to beneﬁt from the relative
ease of gathering Norwegians to take part in new research biobanks in the future.
In Norway, a new Health Research Act was passed in the Norwegian Parliament
in June 2008 to replace the Norwegian Biobank Act. The aim of the new legislation
is to remove bureaucratic obstacles for health research, by making the application
and approval process of new health research projects better and less cumbersome for
researchers. The measures of the new Act includes opening up for the use of broad
consent, where, for instance, biobank research participants consent to take part in
future and yet unspeciﬁed research projects carried out using their biobank material.
Which political and ethical challenges does commercialization imply? In the case
of public research biobanks like the Norwegian biobank HUNT (http://www.
ntnu.no/hunt/english), which is totally dependent on the voluntary participation of
the invited citizens, trust is vital. Erosion of trust threatens to disrupt the recruitment
of new participants and make people already enrolled decide to leave the biobank.
How does trust go together with commercialization for participants? In a focus
group study with HUNT participants, it was found that commercialization was
indeed seen as the main threat to the trustworthiness of HUNT (see, for example,
Skolbekken et al. 2005). Commercialization was seen as potentially introducing
other aims than those that motivated the participants to take part: while the par-
ticipants described their motivation to take part in terms of a contribution to
improvements in health care based on principles of justice, beneﬁcence and soli-
darity, commercialization was seen as potentially leading to research guided by
might rather than right, to the beneﬁt of the wealthy rather than the needy. However,
if commercially funded research was approved of by local research ethics com-
mittees and came in addition to, rather than instead of, publicly funded research, it
was not seen as necessarily in conﬂict with the trustworthiness of HUNT.
This nuance in the public assessment of commercialization of biobank research is
found in several studies in different countries, for instance in Sweden:
Patients may voice strong concern about contributing to research sponsored by
private companies, as opposed to research sponsored by foundations, but in a
study of actual donors, only 1% refused to allow their tissue to be used for
commercial research. In our study, a minority of the respondents said that their
decision to donate a sample would be inﬂuenced by the ﬁnancial support for
the research. Most chose to delegate this judgment to the ethics committee.
Another Swedish study conﬁrms that the majority of the public are willing to
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committees (Kettis-Lindblad et al. 2006, p. 437).
Biobank participants contribute on the premise that research is done which really
does beneﬁt the common good. Biobank research should aim for external justice in
avoiding a bias of interest in diseases affecting the rich rather than the poor. On the
other hand, as a matter of internal justice, no party involved in the biobank research
process should be exploited by another.
The concern for internal justice in the research process is expressed by biobank
participants in opposing the idea of commercial companies making proﬁts from the
participants’ voluntary and unpaid contributions to the biobank. Their contributions
are both in the form of research participation and in paying taxes for ﬁnancing the
biobank as a public enterprise. The industry is in short getting something for
nothing, while the participants are getting nothing for something. Still, participants
think that denying the pharmaceutical industry access to data from public biobanks
means that a lot of potentially useful research simply will not be done.
This concern questions the traditional way, especially in Britain, of conceiving
contributions to health care and medical research in terms of the so-called gift
relationship. In his classical work from 1970, Richard Titmuss argued that blood
donations should be treated as gifts rather than commodities, as commercialization
of blood donations would have adverse effects on solidarity and altruism (Titmuss
1970/1997). But, in order to involve commercial research in a just way the gift
model is seen as inappropriate—both in the case of a purely commercial biobank
like the one of deCODE, and in the case of a planned public/private collaboration
like the one of HUNT Biosciences. Thus the notion of beneﬁt-sharing between the
proﬁt-making party and the non-proﬁt party has been suggested. In their discussion
of the views of potential participants in the planned biobank project Generation
Scotland, Haddow and colleagues argues that some kind of beneﬁt-sharing should
be introduced:
Whilst, historically, medical research and therapies have relied on the ‘gift’
model, this might not be appropriate in the present context as it no longer
accurately reﬂects public attitudes towards the commercial realities of the
research enterprise. Our research indicates that elements of the current
approach are being challenged and that corrective action is required. The
challenges include: (1) the expanding phenomenon of patient and advocacy
groups which seek a more active role in genetic research, (2) the growing
perception of injustice with respect to an institutional framework which, on the
one hand, promotes participant altruism, and yet, on the other hand, sanctions
third party commercialisation and private property rights, (3) the perceived
inadequacy of regulatory control mechanisms which make no mention of
‘property’, and ﬁnally, (4) the suggestion that commercialisation practices can
be ‘tolerated’ in certain circumstances (Haddow et al. 2007, p. 281).
The problem with the perspectives of gifting and altruism is that they deﬂect
attention away from the participants’ concerns about injustice in the research
enterprise, and obstruct a discussion of this aspect of commercialization. The
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information belong to a different sphere than the economy of commercial
exploitation of the same tissue and information.
In order to address these concerns about fairness, the perspective of private
property can be introduced on the side of participants as well, in an attempt to
achieve some kind of symmetrical relation between donors and the industry.
Introducing property rights for participants holds out the promise of tearing down
the glass wall between participants and pharmaceutical companies which is seen to
legitimize an exploitation of research participants by the industry. The paradigmatic
case in this respect is the case of John Moore, who in 1976 underwent treatment for
his leukemia when his doctor decided to create a cell line from his spleen. The cell
line was successfully patented and became quite proﬁtable for Mr. Moore’s doctor.
Mr. Moore subsequently took the case to court to claim the property right to the cell
line in order to gain part of the proﬁt. The California Supreme Court, however,
decided that Mr. Moore’s spleen simply was not his property, while the cell line
clearly was the property of the university holding the patent rights [Moore v.
Regents of the University of California, 793 p.2d 479 (Cal. 1990)]. The ruling of the
court was in line with the principle that ‘‘anything under the sun made by man’’ is
patentable—except man himself. Judging by this principle, it was clear that no-one
holds any patent rights to their own body or body parts, while anything made from
the natural resource of human tissue in principle is patentable.
Research participants could, however, be equipped with property rights different
from patent rights that could enable the individual to re-negotiate the contract with
the research institution to include beneﬁt-sharing. The meaning and importance of
the informed consent form to be signed by biobank participants would in that case
all of a sudden be clear: instead of being an ugly duckling—a confusing statement
of autonomy and altruism, dependent on the vagueness of trust—it grows into the
swan of a real transparent contract between the stakeholders of biobank research
(Skolbekken et al. 2005, p. 345).
The perspective of tissue as private property has few ethical and political
problems with commercial biobanking. Commercial biobanking seems to suit the
enterprising individual, who worries productively and personally takes charge of his
or her own biobank material and his or her health and body and carefully looks after
it. DeCODEme, for instance, offers ‘‘a genetic health scan. Getting to know your
personal genome will empower you and provide you with a road map to improve
your health’’ (http://www.decodeme.com, accessed May 29, 2009).
The Rights and Duties of Privacy
However, in addressing the question of the ethical and political challenges of
commercial biobanking, it is important to distinguish between commercialization
and privatization. As pointed out by research participants: their worry concerning
commercialization is the introduction of other aims than the common good and the
possibility of losing control of the research, rather than the prospect of research
conducted by private companies as such. A HUNT participant puts it this way:
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circulars, I’m pretty conﬁdent that [the samples] won’t be abused in the
society we have at the present. And will continue to have—in my day,
anyhow. It is however hard to tell anything about the society of the future,
because it [the society] seems to be governed pretty much by economics,
capital and those kinds of values (Skolbekken et al. 2005).
For a private company it might be more proﬁtable to develop expensive
preventive drugs aimed to be used by large risk groups for decades, rather than
cheap and effective drugs which do away with a problem once and for all. And, as
remarked by Ron Bouchard and Trudo Lemmens: ‘‘[O]nce the marketplace has
control over the funding, development and licensure of biomedical products, it can
shape human needs primarily toward products that the market itself can develop’’
(Bouchard and Lemmens 2008, p. 32).
And, if public research is governed more and more in the line of satisfying a
market in terms of output—in terms of published articles on new risk factors,
initiating research which attracts external funding, keeping knowledge out of the
public domain by the use of patenting, creating spin-out companies—then the voiced
worry concerning commercialization affects public researchas well as private. In this
perspective, both private and public research can be termed commercial. This leads
to a set of fundamental questions concerning the governmental role towards public
health, as pointed out by Bouchard and Lemmens: ‘‘Is it the primary function of
public health agencies to protect the public? Is it to stimulate the economy through
biomedical research commercialization? And, if both, where does the balance lie on
a scale of public to private concerns?’’ (2008, p. 35, emphasis added).
Moreover, if group and external factors are de-emphasized, while factors
dependent on lifestyle and personal choice is emphasized, such that individual
citizens are seen as governors of their own health, the task of both private and public
biobank research will be to map the terrain of risk information and preventive
measures and ‘‘empower’’ the citizens to maneuver in this terrain in the spirit of
deCODEme.
Another useful distinction when addressing the ethical question of commercial-
ization in this ﬁeld is between the concepts of persons and things, or between
persons and property. The distinction between a person and a thing is known in legal
terms at least since the Roman Law, but is argued to take on a special signiﬁcance in
capitalist economy, as Klaus Høyer argues with the help of Thomas Haskell:
For markets to emerge, people had to be able to sell their labour as a
commodity. Accordingly, [Thomas Haskell] argues, the emergence of a
capitalist mode of production is connected to the abolition of slavery. The
stabilized legitimacy of the alienation of labour is thus intertwined with the
emerging inalienability of the body. Besides, in a capitalist economy, people
must serve not only as labourers but also as consumers, the latter being
incompatible with a slave-based economy. The double function of the worker
as labour reserve and consumer generates overall more wealth for the
capitalist entrepreneur. My claim is that, in the course of this historical
process, persons as bodily agents and commodities as things became naturally
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the antithesis of the other (Hoeyer 2007, p. 330).
The moral distinction between persons and things makes for strong reactions to
transgressions of this divide. Commodiﬁcation transgresses the distinction between
person and thing and is generally regarded as incompatible with human dignity.
This is explicitly stated for instance in the Formula of Humanity of Kant: the
version of the Categorical Imperative that demands that we treat each individual as
an end in him/herself and never merely as a means.
The installment of property rights as the way to tackle political and ethical
challenges of commercialization is controversial because it is open to accusations of
commodiﬁcation. We can bring this out by returning to the Moore case: granting
property rights of tissue to Mr. Moore or to biobank participants requires the bold
step of blurring the line between a person and an object. The California Supreme
Court argued accordingly that granting Mr. Moore property rights to his spleen
would amount to making commodiﬁcation of the human body legitimate.
The gift model promoted by Titmuss was an attempt to block commodiﬁcation of
the human body to avoid moral exploitation. The principle that all participation in
medical research should be voluntary can also be invoked to question the legitimacy
of granting research participants property rights—if it leads to participation being
motivated by economic pressure. A problem with the gift model is, however, that
giving a gift implies ownership. You cannot give what you do not own. In this way,
the very idea of gift-giving presupposes the perspective of individual property rights
rather than presenting an alternative view.
The biobank research enterprise does, however, by its very nature challenge the
strict distinction between person and thing, because it is not obvious how the blood
donated to a biobank ﬁt into either of these categories. The blood provided to a
biobank is more than just a thing for the participants: it contains their genes and can
be linked to other information provided by the participants or coming from public
registers. In a study in Sweden, biobank participants expressed ambiguous views of
the nature of their contributed blood sample. The overriding majority, however,
thought that getting paid to donate tissue samples was unethical. Interestingly, the
participants saw the act of giving without getting paid as making sure that ‘‘the
recipient … feel certain obligations’’ (Hoeyer 2005, p. 57).
Identifying the nature of these obligations seems to be the crux of the matter here.
To view participants’ interests in terms of individual property rights obscure rather
than clarify the challenges of commercialization. It makes us ask who actually owns
genetic material, for instance, which imposes a false dilemma on us: Does the
genetic material belong to the person it stems from, and if it does not, does this
make the human body into a natural resource, to be harvested by a researcher like in
the Moore case? Does it make the human body into a public resource, making it a
property of the State, grounding, for instance, a legal duty of taking part in national
or regional biobank projects like HUNT? Neither talking about a person owning her
own body nor talking about the State owning a person’s body seems to provide us
with an adequate answer to the legitimate concerns of the participants’ regarding the
governance of biobanking.
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of privacy in the context of biobanking is the principle of voluntary participation.
The requirement of informed consent acts consequently as protection of privacy by
setting up a barrier against having to give up privacy. But the notion of privacy
should be relevant to biobanking. Privacy should therefore be something more than
a negative right. As pointed out by Laurie: ‘‘A serious limitation on any concept of
privacy is the fact that, as a right, it is negative in nature. … To this extent, privacy
suffers from limitations similar to those that afﬂict the principle of respect for
autonomy; namely, it does not provide for any continuing control over personal
matters once they enter the public sphere’’ (Laurie 2002, p. 300). This suggests an
emphasis on the interests of the participants, as individuals and as members of a
group. Rather than to see privacy and property rights as the control of an object (or
of a subject—oneself extended into the biobank), we should see these rights as
balanced by duties, that is as inherently relational interests extending into the public
sphere.
The ambiguous nature of biobank material invites us to think in terms of
managing the duties and rights involved in biobank research with the aim of better
public health. Such management demand a kind of co-ownership of biobank
material, for instance in the form of establishing charitable trusts, as the one
proposed by David Winickoff, where donors are supposed to own the contributed
material in the sense of having an individual right of opting out, and a collective
right to decide on the use of the material—including outside use, for instance by the
industry. According to Winickoff, his ‘‘Biotrust model’’ aims to contribute to the
ongoing project to construct a genomic governance that acceptably orders the
interface between public and private [that] reconceive genomics as an
enterprise driven not by proﬁt, but by collective political will. The Biotrust
Model (…) seeks the elusive balance between respecting the dignity of human
persons and generating public value, a balance that has been unsettled by the
new modalities of biological science, technology, and property. In order to
accomplish these tasks, it constructs a hybrid legal identity for genomic
resources, one that stakes out a position between personhood and property, gift
and commodity, group and individual, public and private. Its merit, if it has
any, will be measured not by its theoretical novelty, but by its practical ability
to open pathways of democratic governance through complex technoscientiﬁc
endeavors (Winickoff and Neumann 2005, pp. 18–19).
One aspect of addressing the ethical and political challenges of commercial
biobanking is thus to ﬁnd a way to avoid both economic and moral exploitation of
research participants in accomplishing the common goal of improved health care. If
tackled in terms of property rights, these rights should be subject to conditions both
protecting the privacy and dignity of the participants and the interest in making
biobank research feasible. We should not think of the issues of privacy and property
as a simple conﬂict between individuals’ interest in privacy and society’s interest in
doing research. The issue of property rights brought forth by commercialized
biobanking shows that there is a considerable public interest in protecting the
privacy of individuals to protect their bodily integrity and to promote the
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123recognition of proper respectfulness of each individual as a person. The individuals,
on their part, have a considerable interest in enabling research.
But is not this way of thinking about privacy at odds with fundamental principles
of liberal societies? Is it not so that the right to privacy is the yardstick of the degree
of civilization in a society? Is not the privacy granted the individual a right more
fundamental than individual autonomy and liberty, in being a presupposition for
both? The answer to this is that it is the legitimacy of privacy claims which has to be
assessed in their speciﬁc relations, in a precise manner. Indeed, sometimes privacy
is prior to liberty, in cases where the individual is prepared to waive her right to
privacy but is denied this by ethical or legal barriers.
The dependence of liberty on privacy is a contingent matter: while totalitarian
regimes gave you a reason to have privacy concerning religious views for instance,
liberal societies should have reached the state of making privacy unnecessary
because of pervasive tolerance. In the same way, the need for genetic privacy will
depend on the social and economic sanctions present in society regarding genetic
variations and disease traits. Privacy is not just about separateness and control, but
also about as integrity and respect for persons. The right to privacy is the
fundamental right to be recognised as a person, and not as an object and a mere
means for the ends of others. In this sense, the right to privacy is quite fundamental
and inalienable.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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